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The human development sectors, overlapping substantially 
with the social services, are primarily in the domain of the states in 
terms of the constitutional assignment of functions in India.  In the 
urgent and substantial task of raising the level of human development 
of their citizens, the basic challenge faced by most of the states of 
India is to break the 'vicious circle' of poverty, low human 
development and low income. Low levels of income across the 
population also limit the ability of the state governments to finance 
human development through their own resources. This  is clearly 
indicated by the strong association between public expenditures and 
per capita incomes often noticed by researchers, both across states 
and over time. Moreover, within the framework of fiscal responsibility 
legislation which has been enacted by the centre  as also  several 
states(after  the strong support it got from the Twelfth Finance 
Commission), it is not feasible to vigorously push for  public 
expenditures financed by deficits, and consequent borrowings.  
 
Over and above this constraint, for most of the states a large 
part of budgetary expenditure consists of committed expenditure of 
some sort or the other (salaries, interest payments, loan repayments 
and other contractual payments). Given that in the short and even in 
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the medium term most of these expenditures cannot be reduced 
drastically and  that  the macroeconomic performance cannot be 
suddenly improved through action at the state level alone,  an 
important method of managing resources to finance  consistent and 
balanced human development lies in the reprioritisation of current 
expenditure  in  accordance  with the  urgent needs and shortfalls in 
particular areas. Such reprioritisation should also lead the states to a 
better macroeconomic future, through improvements in key areas. 
The key issue then is: what scope is there for reallocating public 
expenditures at the  state level to finance increased attention to 
human development? To provide some empirical content to this 
discussion, we try to develop an objective method for reprioritisation 
of public expenditure in this paper. The suggested framework may be 
taken to  yield a benchmark for any prescription for expenditure 
reallocation. As we shall see below, the method is particularly suitable 
for analysis of sub-national expenditure, although it can conceivably 
be used to analyse public expenditures of a group of governmental 
units at any level. 
 
 
II. Reallocation of Expenditures: Conceptual Framework 
 
 
In most studies of government expenditure, policy priorities 
are either assumed to be given, or are part of the recommendations 
based on subjective assessments  and/or perceived shortfalls in 
specific areas. Moreover, revealed priorities for various sectors are 
not easily discernible from their shares in total expenditure, since the 
expenditure patterns are determined both by the quantity of the 
service supplied and its unit cost.
1 Thus, revealed priorities in terms of 
expenditure shares can differ substantially from priorities in terms of 
units supplied of the  concerned  service. Further, there is no strong 
reason to prefer one over the other. Thus, there are two m ajor 
stumbling blocks to an assessment of public expenditure patterns vis-
à-vis policy priorities: (a) a definitive or objectively determined pattern 
of priorities is not available; and (b) even if it was available, there is 
no unique method of assessing p ublic expenditure patterns against 
the given priorities. The standard consumer theory solves a similar 
problem through the maximisation of the utility function in which 
various commodities and their prices enter as arguments, subject to a 
budget constraint. In this case, it is the utility function of the 
government that is missing.    5   
 
The basic assumption that is made here is that each state in 
the country compares itself with the other states and strives to 
achieve the best that has been a ttained by any other state in each 
sector.
2 The corollary of this is that the further the state is from the 
best in any sector, the greater is the priority placed on that sector. 
Clearly then, the priority placed on any one sector by any state at any 
point in time is inversely related to the achievement of that state. The 
comparison is made in terms of available physical performance 
indicators in each sector, which we denote, by  ij P  where i indicates 
sectors and j is indicative of states. An absence of the state subscript 
represents the state under consideration. The best (and thus the 
target) is indicated by an asterisk, so that, 
*
ij P  indicates the best 
performance among all the states. As per our assumption, the 
priorities for each sector, denoted by  i W  are given by  
 
* ()/ iijii WPPP =-   (1.1) 
 
As an example, let us consider the case of Urban 
Development. Here the indicator that we have  considered is 
headcount ratio of the urban poor (percentage of urban population 
living below the poverty line). In the following table we show the 













Table 1: Calculation of Wi’s from Indicators   6   
 
Note:  urb_pov:  HCR of Note:  Urban Poor in 2004-05; min_urb_pov:  Minimum of 
urb_pov; Wi: Wi's pertaining to 2004-05;  
     
This essentially amounts to asserting that the weight for each 
sector is given by the percentage change that would be required in 
the sectoral indicator to reach the best performance level by any 
state. It should be noted here that the nature of the indicators used 
are such that while for some a higher value is desirable, for others the 
lower the value of the indicator, the better the performance is (e.g., 
Urban Development, Rural Development). This however, does not 
pose a major problem since only the positive values of the computed 
i W -s (which denotes the change required to reach the best level – 
highest or lowest as the case may be) need to be considered for 
subsequent computations.  
 
Denoting unit costs for the state, under consideration for each 
of the services by i C , the normative allocation for each sector should 
then satisfy,  
 
ii TEXPkWC D= ￿ ,  (1.2) 
States  urb_pov  min_urb_pov  Wi 
Andhra Pradesh  27.99055  3.2997  -0.8821 
Assam  3.29973  3.2997  0.0000 
Bihar  34.64444  3.2997  -0.9048 
Gujarat  13.03368  3.2997  -0.7468 
Haryana  15.06436  3.2997  -0.7810 
Karnataka  32.56947  3.2997  -0.8987 
Kerala  20.18239  3.2997  -0.8365 
Madhya Pradesh  42.13874  3.2997  -0.9217 
Maharashtra  32.24326  3.2997  -0.8977 
Orissa  44.30679  3.2997  -0.9255 
Punjab  7.07187  3.2997  -0.5334 
Rajasthan  32.94099  3.2997  -0.8998 
Tamil Nadu  22.19905  3.2997  -0.8514 
Uttar Pradesh  30.63707  3.2997  -0.8923 
West Bengal  14.79947  3.2997  -0.7770   7   
where TEXP is total public expenditure of the state, and k is a 
constant multiple that is determined each year by the overall 










,  (1.3) 
 
where  t TEXP is the actual expenditure of the current year and 
1 t TEXP-  is  that of the previous year. This is simply saying that the 
normative proportions of incremental public expenditure for each 
service are given by the cost of reaching best performance levels for 
each sector. 
 
This simple model allows us to construct a pattern of priorities 
and assess the allocation of public expenditures against the priorities 
thus derived. Further, it allows us to recommend changes in the 
allocation of total public expenditure on an objective basis. 
 
Suppose for any service  i, the initial value of indicator for a 
state is given by  ,0 i P  and the same for the latest year is given by , it P . 
Then our estimate of unit cost is given by, 
   
,,0 /() iiiti CPEXPPP =- ￿ ,  (1.4) 
 
where the summation is defined over the period 0 to t in constant 
prices (So  PEXP is public expenditure in real terms). We should 
hasten to add that although this method apparently ascribes all 
changes in the performance indicator to government expenditures 
alone, that is not our contention. The unit costs estimated in this 
manner are used for the limited purpose of obtaining a rough estimate 
of (implicitly) necessary government expenditure for each of the 
services to reach the goal,  assuming no major change in the 
covariability in the pattern of other variables that determine the value 
of the indicator. In other words, the change in the indicator over the 
reference period is associated with a certain amount of government 
expenditure  in real terms, and we hypothesise that while prioritising 
government expenditures, the same association is believed to 
continue unless there is a substantial change in the other 
determinants of the indicator value.    8   
  The above method of computing unit costs, however, breaks 
down in case the indicator does not improve over a period of time or 
shows deterioration. In such cases (which may be rare, but cannot be 
ruled out), the entire logic of government expenditures resulting in 
some improvement in terms of the indicators falls apart, as we are 
faced with a situation of substantial cumulative government 
expenditures being divided by zero or negative change in the 
indicator. This may or may not reflect on the efficiency of the public 
expenditures; it is conceptually possible that the hypothetical indicator 
value would have been worse than the actual observed in the final 
year in the absence of such expenditure, but there is nothing in our 
model to test it and allow for it. In such cases, we have to fall back on 
the inferior method of maintaining average annual expenditure in real 
terms so that in such cases 
 
  / iii WCPEXPn =￿ ,  (1.5) 
 
where  n represents the number of years over which public 
expenditure in that area in real terms is cumulated. 
 
 
III. Physical Performance Indicators 
 
 
Public expenditure may be reallocated to different sectors on 
the basis of the requirements and shortfalls of the particular sectors. 
To compute the shortfalls in achievements of the sectors, we need 
some measure of the performance of each sector. In this section we 
discuss the different performance indicators that we use to measure 
these shortfalls for each of the sectors under our consideration. Table 
2 below contains a summary glance at the indicators and the data 









Table 2: Details of the Indicators and the Data used   9   
  
Indicator  Formulae  Components  Period of Data 
Used 
Literacy rate of the 
states 
1991 and 2001  1. Education  The simple average 
of literacy rate of the 
states and inverse of 
the drop out rate has 
been taken 



















against all diseases 
and life expectancy 
at birth 













safe drinking water 
facilities 
1991 and 2001 
Percentage of 
households living in 
pucca/permanent 
houses 
1991 and 2001  4. Housing  The weighted 
average of 
percentage of 
households living in 
pucca/permanent 





households living in 
semi-pucca/ semi-
permanent houses 
1991 and 2001 
5. Urban 
development 
Percentage of urban 
population living 
below the poverty 
line (head count 
ratio) 






Percentage of rural 
population living 
below the poverty 
line (head count 
ratio) 







1991 and 2001  7. Labour and 
unemployment 
Ratio of total 
estimated 
employment (in man 
days) and total 
population  
Total population  1991 and 2001 
 
 
Table 2: Details of the Indicators and the Data used (contd.)   10   
  











Ratio of agricultural 
GSDP (agriculture 
minus mining and 












9. Irrigation and 
flood control 
Ratio of total irrigated 




























11. Industry and 
minerals 
Per capita industrial 





Total road length 
(national 
highways and 




12. Transport  Ratio of total road 
length (national 
highways and state 
highways) to total 
geographical area of 




Note: For the purpose of cross-state comparisons, indicator values for only the latest 
possible year have been used. Values for two points of time are needed only for those 




The first column in the above table lists the twelve sectors 
that we have considered for our reprioritisation exercise. The next two 
columns give the formulae and components thereof (if the indicator 
used is a composite o ne) that have been used to estimate the   11   
physical performance indicator for different sectors. Finally, in the last 
column we note the period of data used for each component. We note 
that except for  housing, whenever we have used more than one 
component in the formula, we have taken a simple average of the two 
component parts. For example, the indicator for education consists of 
two parts, the literacy rate of the state (according to census of 1991 
and 2001) and the dropout rate in classes one through five (for the 
years 1992-93 and 2001-02). The composite indicator for  education 
for each state is the simple average of the two component parts – 
literacy rate and dropout rate.  
 
The indicator for  health has three parts, (i) infant mortality 
rate (IMR), (ii) percentage of children vaccinated against all vaccine 
preventable diseases and (iii) life expectancy at birth. However, the 
infant mortality rate could not be used directly into calculation of the 
indicator value because of two reasons. First, it actually indicates the 
“underachievement” of the states and second, it is given in units of 
per thousand live births. To convert it into an indicator of 
“achievement”, we deduct the value of IMR from 1000 and to change 
it to percentage terms divide it by 10. This way the resulting indicator 
for IMR gives us the percentage of live births that do “not die”. Now to 
calculate the composite indicator for the health sector we take, again, 
a simple average of the new IMR indicator calculated by us, and, the 
other two components, namely, percentage of vaccinated children 
and life expectancy at birth.  
 
However, as noted already, the composite indicator for 
housing is not a simple average of its component parts,  viz., 
percentage or households living in  pucca/permanent houses and 
percentage of households living in  semi-pucca/semi-permanent 
houses. Rather, we have taken a weighted average of the two with 
the former accounting for 75 percent of the weight. This is simply 
because we view  pucca/permanent housing for all as the ultimate 
goal. Hence, this weighting rewards those states that have a higher 
percentage of people living in that type of houses than others.  
 
Two other sectoral indicators that require special explanation 
are that of urban development and rural development. These are very 
wide areas with several facets, for each of which we should ideally 
use one indicator. Essentially, partly to simplify as also because of a 
dearth of suitable indicators that are available for the required two 
points of time, we have taken urban and rural poverty levels i.e. the   12   
head count ratio (HCR) of the urban/rural poor as the indicator of the 
urban/rural  development. Obviously, the lower the value of this 
indicator, the higher is the achievement of the state in the sector.
3 
 
The sources of data used for the purpose of arriving at the 
indicators are listed in the annexure. 
 
All the other indicators in the table are self-explanatory.
4 
However, it may be noted that the general services have been kept 
out of the analysis, primarily because it i s difficult to think of an 
indicator for this purpose. Also, the general services are 
overwhelmingly either contractual payments (interest and salaries) or 
on goods and services that are in the nature of ‘overheads of the 
government’. We have also excluded some other sectors where the 
expenditures are primarily in the nature of transfer payments and 
associated administrative costs.  
 
 
IV. Application of the Methodology on a few States 
 
 
We now apply the above methodology to illustrate calculation 
of reprioritised expenditures of four states – Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, 
Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal – for the years 2003-04 and 2004-05 (it 
may be reiterated that this method is applied to the  change in the 
overall expenditure envelope). The states whose performances are 
taken into consideration for the comparisons include the non-special 
categories excluding the new  states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh 
(primarily because of data problems) and include the special-category 
state of Assam. We estimate the expenditure pattern that would have 
resulted in 2004-05 from the application of this methodology, as 
against the actual pattern. The results for each of the four states are 
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Table 3: Actual and Estimated Expenditures on  
Selected Services in Madhya Pradesh 
(Rs. lakh) 




Education  257598.44  237577.78 
Health  89809.32  79923.16 
Water supply  46538.26  46403.51 
Housing  8587.68  7109.68 
Urban development  16333.71  28010.43 
Rural development  100826.54  83252.61 
Labour and employment  5750.78  5747.98 
Agriculture and allied  130270.59  119825.67 
Irrigation and flood control  199873.18  135427.16 
Energy  321298.50  428264.10 
Industry & minerals  8767.17  7455.64 
Transport  68719.97  75376.40 
Total of the above  1254374.14  1254374.14 
 
It can easily be seen that the estimated allocation pattern is 
not drastically different from the actual. Of course, this is partly 
because of the fact that we are using the normative method of 
allocation only at the margin, that is, on the change from the previous 
year. However, it may be noticed that the estimated allocation (a) 
shifts expenditures from rural development to urban development to a 
considerable extent; (b) provides substantially larger funds for power 
and transport sector, with substantial reduction in irrigation and flood 
control; and (c) reduces total allocation for human development 
sector considerably, as it reduces allocations to all human 
development sectors except urban development. The broad 
interpretation is that given relative achievements of the State in the 
listed sectors, it needs to pay more attention to physical infrastructure, 
particularly power, and that it is already spending a little more than 
what would be recommended on the basis of the method used here in 
the area of human development. The lesson, of course, is that we 
may not expect any substantial reallocation in favour of human 
development sectors, although the same  within the human 
development sectors is possible.    14   
Table 4: Actual and Estimated Expenditures on 
Selected Services in Orissa 
(Rs. lakh)  




Education  199740.48  189993.57 
Health  63089.83  31142.43 
Water supply  27550.23  25819.25 
Housing  7814.31  5786.03 
Urban development  3732.23  4867.30 
Rural development  46770.78  45930.43 
Labour and employment  2301.71  17023.37 
Agriculture and allied  59003.35  69938.38 
Irrigation and flood control  69413.04  73733.81 
Energy  8034.98  4946.65 
Industry & minerals  4629.69  4998.36 
Transport  50443.25  68344.29 
Total of the above  542523.88  542523.88 
 
In the case of Orissa, the most noticeable feature in a 
comparison of the two relevant columns is the substantial reallocation 
into labour and employment and, to a smaller extent, the reduction in 
health expenditures in the estimated allocation. These essentially 
reflect a relatively low rate of employment and a very small increase 
in employment between 1991 and 2001 causing  Ci to be large for 
labour and employment, and the fact that there h as been a 
substantial step-up in health expenditures in 2004-05 compared to 
the previous years. Broadly, there is a reallocation from human 
development sectors to almost all physical infrastructure sectors 
(barring energy) in the estimated figures, possibly reflecting a bias in 
the actual allocation pattern in favour of the former, as also the 
relatively greater gaps with respect to physical infrastructure from the 
best achieved by other states. 
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Table 5: Actual and Estimated Expenditures on 
Selected Services in Tamil Nadu 
(Rs. lakh)  




Education  469666.27  426321.59 
Health  135194.90  126892.16 
Water supply  153142.34  69481.05 
Housing  41128.49  15297.64 
Urban development  66392.07  99110.60 
Rural development  96049.57  90888.91 
Labour and employment  10250.48  43802.36 
Agriculture and allied  139102.25  120007.69 
Irrigation and flood control  84730.09  115360.25 
Energy  114941.07  64048.24 
Industry & minerals  24562.86  22425.63 
Transport  148052.26  289576.53 
Total of the above  1483212.65  1483212.65 
 
The estimates for Tamil Nadu narrates a completely different 
and peculiar story. On the one hand, it prescribes a large reduction in 
expenditure on water supply (not surprisingly, as over 85 percent of 
the population already have access to safe drinking water) and on the 
other, a large increase in expenditure on labour and employment. 
There is also a massive shift in expenditure from energy in favour of 
the transport  sector (the indicator value is almost h alf of the best 
performer and has not improved much over the entire period of 
consideration). The other expenditures are left more or less 
unchanged, one noticeable change being in the urban development 
sector; our estimates require a doubling of the actual allocation of 
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Table 6: Actual and Estimated Expenditures on 
Selected Services in West Bengal 
(Rs. lakh)  
Sectors  Actual Expenditure 
2004-05 
Estimated Expenditure  
2004-05 
Education  498389.31  452396.15 
Health  141594.13  140373.17 
Water supply  31188.61  35308.12 
Housing  7125.96  5940.38 
Urban development  67852.79  72271.14 
Rural development  85442.99  73664.31 
Labour and employment  5318.65  5269.66 
Agriculture and allied  76586.56  74635.84 
Irrigation and flood control  64137.57  59965.59 
Energy  40861.40  14821.74 
Industry & minerals  104383.89  18125.42 
Transport  103272.96  273383.29 
Total of the above  1226154.82  1226154.82 
 
In the case of West Bengal,  human  development 
expenditures are left more or less unchanged in the estimates, with 
some reallocation from education to water supply, and from rural 
development to urban. However, in the physical infrastructure and 
economic services, there is a marked increase in expenditure on the 
transport sector, coupled with a major reduction in the industries and 
minerals sector, a substantial reduction in the energy sector and 
smaller reductions in all other economic services considered. Given 
the values of the indicator for the transport sector,
5 the large 
reallocation prescribed by our estimates in its favour is not surprising; 
but the large reduction in the expenditure on industries and minerals 
sector does indicate a need for closer look at this sector in the state. 
While we do not attempt such an exploration here, it may be 
worthwhile noting that the state did spend an unusually (in 
comparison to other states) high amount on this sector. 
 
Conspicuously, the unifying characteristic of all the states 
under consideration is that the estimates ask for greater expenditure 
on basically three heads: ( i)  labour and employment; ( ii) transport;   17   
and ( iii) urban d evelopment, but there is no uniformity in the sectors 
as far as lowering of expenditure is concerned. The exception is the 
persistent requirement of reducing expenditure  on  rural development 
in  favour of urban development. This, however, could  merely be a 
result of the method of reallocation, which only considers the poverty 
ratios in rural and urban areas without weighting them with the 
relevant population shares that must be important for  the  actual 
allocation process.  Such a possibility points to further refinements 
possible in the indicators used.  
 
Another important characteristic of the reprioritised 
expenditures is that for all the four states the total expenditure for 
human development sectors is either left more or less unchanged or 
is reduced in the reallocation process. This indicates that in a broad 
sense, states do give due importance to the human development 
sectors in practice or even favour it somewhat. Most studies of long-
term trends in government expenditures also find that social sectors 
together usually hold or improve their share in total expenditure over 
the long run. This could partly be explained by the fact that social 
services together have a much higher wage component in  the total 
expenditures than economic services, including infrastructure, the 
latter actually requiring greater capital and maintenance expenditures. 
It is well-known that wages being contractual in nature are difficult to 
reduce; even holding the wage bill steady may be difficult in India 
because of the periodical Pay Commission recommended increases. 
This phenomenon keeps raising the unit costs even when the weight 
does not increase, resulting in progressively higher share of social 
services in the total expenditures. In contrast, the capital expenditures 
and maintenance costs are ‘fair-weather’  components of total 
expenditure  given the nod only when state finances are relatively 
comfortable.  
 
At this juncture, it may be pertinent to note that it would be a 
mistake to consider that each of the sectors is independent of the 
other, although by assuming that changes in the indicator(s) for one 
sector are related to expenditures in that sector only, we are implicitly 
assuming so. Commonsense tells us, and there is plenty of research 
output to show that there are complementarities between sectors, 
even between social services like health and physical infrastructure 
like, power. To understand the synergy in a micro sense, one just 
needs to think about an X -ray machine, which cannot be operated 
without power. Our implicit assumption can thus be defended only as   18   
a simplifying one and not necessarily reflecting the reality. The 
methodology can, however, be broadened to include cross effects if 







While the methodology used in the above analyses appears 
simple, its application is not, mainly because of data limitations and 
difficulties in identifying suitable indicator(s) for each sector. Thus, the 
estimations presented above can at best be called illustrative. Even 
when suitable indicators are available, estimation of unit costs for 
various services can pose problems, since the actual costs are not 
necessarily efficient. However, our admittedly crude method can 
nevertheless be used for this purpose provided no major  in 
determinants other than public expenditure relevant for each of the 
indicators  takes place that may affect the unit costs substantially. 
These are areas where f urther research may be called for. On the 
positive side, this represents at the least a more objective method of 
assessing the allocation of government expenditures than mere 
assertions or judgments.  Although there are large parts of 
government expenditure, primarily in general services, for which it is 
difficult to identify a performance indicator, one advantage of this 
construct is that if one believes that certain parts of the public 
expenditure are non-negotiable or pre-determined, then the method 
can be applied to a total expenditure net of those parts. This can 
alternatively be viewed as a method of appropriate allocation of a 
sub-total within the total government expenditures.    19   
End Notes  
 
                                                                 
1 This observation was originally made by Kaushik Basu while discussing a 
paper on trends in government expenditure in Indian states. 
2  Such a hypothesis, known as ‘yardstick competition’ in the fiscal federalism 
literature, was f irst put forward by Salmon (1987). It has been empirically 
tested by Besley and Case (1995). 
3 Alternatively, we could have taken either the inverse of this ratio or 100 
minus this ratio as the indicator value.  
4 Although our computations of the Wi-s have been based on the method 
described in the previous section, the weight used for the transport sector is 
different than the others. Instead of taking the highest value of the indicator 
among all states (which is of Kerala) as the target level, we have taken the 
average of the first and second largest values (the second being that of 
Maharashtra). This is primarily because the value for Kerala is clearly an 
outlier and if taken alone, it tends to greatly overestimate the required 
expenditure in this sector for all other states. 
5 There may be a problem with the data here; since our transport sector 
indicator includes only national and state highways, any state that relies more 
on lower levels of governments, say Zila Parishads, or other public agencies 
for significant parts of the road network may have a lower indicator value than 
warranted. We actually tried different definitions of the status of road network, 
but several anomalies in the available data forced us to adopt the definition 
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Annexure 
 
Indicators and the Data Sources 
  
Indicator for Sector  Data Sources Used 
Education  Census of India, 1991 and 2001. 
All India Educational Survey,  
Education in India, Department of Education, 
MHRD,  
Annual Reports, various years, Department of 
Education, MHRD. 
Selected Education Statistics, 2002-03. 
Health  Compendium of India's Fertility and Mortality 
Indicators 1971-1997, Registrar General, 
India, 1999, SRS Statistical Report and SRS 
Bulletin. 
National Family Health Survey, 1992-93, 
1998-99. 
Water Supply & Housing  Census of India, 1991 and 2001 
Urban Development & 
Rural Development 
Planning Commission 
Labour and Unemployment, 
Irrigation and Flood Control, 
Energy &  Transport  
Statistical Abstract India, various years, CSO, 
Ministry of Statistics and Programme 
Implementation, Government of India. 
Agriculture and Allied, and 
Industry and Minerals 
Detailed Estimates of GSDP, Central 
Statistical Organisation. 
 
 